欺诈的“长相”－－会计欺诈到底是怎样的？

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当注册管帐师所审计的的财政报表自身曾经因为狡诈行动而被曲解，注册管帐师或多或少要负点义务。

60年月的Billy Sol用他其实不具有的化肥槽做典质来获得他永久也没法归还的存款。他的做法很简单，
注册管帐师周一在Amarillo考核过的化肥槽连夜运到Lubbock，这样当注册管帐师周二赶到Lubbock的时分，化肥槽又被计较一遍。诸如斯类的小手段却让债券人遭到数以百万计的丧失。
注册管帐师们为何不在不同地域同时进行审计？缘由或许是他们过于相信他们的客户。可是注册管帐师们又能相信谁呢？

仍是在这个10年，四时护理核心将一批修建条约的支出确认入帐，而该条约根本从未开工。物料推销来并寄存在施工地址， 周围用竹篱围着。而AA的注册管帐师们以为没需要去施工现场，、他们仅仅依托运用竣工百分比法来计较本钱和收益。尽管这在手艺上是正当的， 但这夸张了支出，当这一现实被披露时， 该公司股价大跌。媒体声称注册管帐师被诈骗了，而注册管帐师们却说他们的做法无可厚非。

70年月，一名名叫Diangelis的男士运用了相似Billoy的做法来诈骗注册管帐师，他应用管道把色拉油在不同地域的容器间挪动，这样注册管帐师便把一件资产屡次计较。注册管帐师们又一次被捉弄了。
他们为何没有思索到这些可能性并运用无效手段来包管准确考核存货呢？答复就是， 注册管帐师们那时不需求这么做。而当他们在另外一些案例中发觉了相似问题时，他们却说那不外是与GAAP相关的一个好笑的不测。

以上三个典范圈套有两个是注册管帐师因为客户的狡诈行动而出具过失看法。而“四时护理核心”的崩溃与平安丑闻相似。“四时”公司的管帐对支出确实认不契合逻辑，且就GAAP而言过于牵强。 关于此类诈骗，大众投资者实践上是没法防止的。、
平安事情让我们看到了对所谓“特殊目的实体”观点的滥用。其财政信息的披露是显掉逻辑且牵强的。
这就是在不时转变的狡诈的表示方式。一般这些狡诈是经过应用诸如自力注册管帐师或当局代庖（如调查员）来完成的。他们或许因为涉足咨询服务而使其专业判别遭到蒙蔽，或许因为政治压力而表示为施行有力。

有人说注册管帐师经过协助客户躲避法则来获得收益而使大众好处遭到了损害。这一说法在平安余震中其实不鲜闻。但这能否就意味着行业自律已生效？ 决不为了包管行业自律， 必需不受政治要素的影响，
同时任何原则制订机构必需具有一定命量的非CPA成员，他们经过制订明白的披露法则，标准事务所从业人员的任务，又或是奉行审计轮换制来维护大众好处。

注册管帐师必需保持其客不雅和自力。一个无效的限制是请求审计人员在离开事务所的一段时间内不得在其审计客户公司就任。

注册管帐师行业必需疾速无效的应对平安丑闻，但更主要的是经过无效的治理行业自律来复原大众决心。(感激视野网友robbie编译)

The Face of Fraud 
What Does Fraud Look Like?

Auditors have always been held responsible, one way or another, when a financial statement on which they have opined turns out to be distorted by fraud.

In the 1960s, Billy Sol Estes pledged fertilizer tanks he didn’t have as collateral for loans he couldn’t repay. He fooled the auditors by moving the tanks at night to new locations so that the tanks the auditors counted on Monday in Amarillo were also counted on Tuesday in Lubbock, etc. Illegal and deceitful . . . clearly dishonest. Creditors lost millions. Why didn’t the auditors control all locations at the same time for a comprehensive count? Hindsight, of course is 20-20, but the reason may have been because they trusted their client. Should auditors trust anybody?

Later in that decade, Four Seasons Nursing Centers recognized earnings from construction contracts on which no work had been done. Materials had been purchased and stored on the job sites, protected by chain link fence. Their auditors (Arthur Andersen, for what it’s worth) saw no reason to visit job sites, relying instead on a mechanical calculation that recognized profit on the percentage of completion method by including costs of materials stored on the job sites in a cost-to cost calculation. Technically legal, but it overstated earnings and, when discovered, led to a precipitous decline in the stock price. Newspaper headlines vilified the auditors for their gullibility. The auditors said there was nothing wrong with applying the cost-to-cost method in a mechanical fashion. Financial analysts ( and a federal judge) said that was hogwash.

In the 1970s, a Mr. DiAngelis fooled his auditors by moving salad oil from tank to tank through a complex web of pipes so that they “observed” the same oil several times. Once again, Illegal and deceitful. . . clearly dishonest. Why didn’t the auditors consider that possibility and design procedures to detect any attempt to mess with the inventory? The short answer is that auditors were not then required to design procedures to detect fraud. In those cases where they did discover something amiss, it was just a happy accident associated with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards - - so they said.

Two of these three classic frauds involved deceiving the auditors; one did not. The Four Seasons debacle is not that much different from Enron. In Four Seasons, the accountants accepted an earnings number based on an illogical and strained interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The investing public is virtually defenseless against this type of deceit. The evidence in Enron is clearly indicating serious abuse of so called “special purpose entities” - - arguably a strained and illogical application of disclosure rules. This is the changing face of fraud. Fraud now is often accomplished by co-opting the watchdog, whether an independent auditor, whose judgment is clouded by profits from consulting engagements, or a government agency (think meat inspectors) that can be rendered ineffective by political pressure. [义务编纂：编纂部]
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